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UNION AFFILIATIONS AND THE RIGHTS OF NONUNION
EMPLOYEES
INTRODUCTION

It is a common practice for unions to affiliate.' The National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB or Board) has defined an affiliation as the alignment or association of a union with a new organization when such alignment or association does not result in the dissolution of an already
existing union.2 Affiliations occur in two contexts: Two or more local
unions may merge to form one larger union,3 or a small local union may

merge into a larger national or international union.4
When the NLRB examines an affiliation, 5 it must determine whether

the newly affiliated union should be afforded the protections of the National Labor Relations Act6 (NLRA or Act).7 This examination involves
a two step inquiry.' First, the Board must be satisfied that the decision
to affiliate was made with "due process." 9 Second, the Board will inquire
whether "continuity of representation" exists between the pre- and post1. See Note, Union Mergers and the Amendment Certification Procedure, 28 Cath.
U.L. Rev. 587, 587 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Union Mergers]; Comment, Union Affiliations and Collective Bargaining, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 430, 431 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Union Affiliations]. An independent union may decide to affiliate for various reasons,
including the desire for access to an increased financial base, or a desire for greater bargaining expertise or increased bargaining strength. Financial Inst. Employees, Local No.
1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 360 (9th Cir. 1984); Amoco Prod. Co., 239 N.LR.B. 1195,
1195 (1979), remandedon othergrounds, 613 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1980); Hale, Union Affiliations: Examination of the Governing NLRA Standards, 1983 Det. C.L Rev. 709, 709;
see Dannin, Union Mergers and Affiliations: Discontinuingthe Continuity of Representation Test, 32 Lab. LJ. 170, 170 (1981).
2. See Exchange Bank, 264 N.L.R.B. 822, 823 n.10 (1982) (quoting Amoco Prod.
Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 1195, 1195 (1979)), enforced, 732 F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1984); Aurelia
Osborne Fox Memorial Hosp., 247 N.L.R.B. 356, 358 (1980) (same); see also Providence
Medical Center, 243 N.L.LB. 714, 714 (1979) (affiliation does not cause dissolution of
already existing union).
3. See 1 C. Morris, The Developing Labor Law 691 (2d ed. 1983); Union Mergers,
supra note 1, at 587; see, eg., NLRB v. Newspapers, Inc., 515 F.2d 334, 336-37 (5th Cir.
1975); NLRB v. Commercial Letter, Inc., 496 F.2d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1974); Fur's Cafeterias, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 988, 988-89 (1984); F.W. Woolworth Co., 268 N.LR.B. 805, 805
(1984); Laborer's Int'l Union, Local No. 652, 266 N.L.R.B. 219, 220 (1983).
4. See 1 C. Morris, supra note 3, at 691; Union Mergers, supra note 1, at 587; see,
e.g., Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 357-58 (9th Cir.
1984); Local Union No. 4-14 v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 150, 151 (5th Cir. 1983); Sun Oil Co. v.
NLRB, 576 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir. 1978); Duquesne Light Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 1271, 127 172 (1980); Williamson Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 953, 956 (1979) (Pennelo, Member, dissenting).
5. See infra notes 20-38 and accompanying text.
6. Ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 140 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151169 (1982)).
7. Hale, supra note 1, at 710. See infra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
8. See Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 358 &
n.2, 360-61 (9th Cir. 1984); 1 C. Morris, supra note 3, at 690-92. See infra notes 33-37
and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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affiliation unions. 10
In the past, the purpose of the inquiry was to determine whether the
affiliation decision reflected the desire of the majority of the union's
members." Because the Board viewed affiliations as purely internal
union matters, it did not require that nonunion employees in the bargaining unit be allowed to vote in the affiliation decision.' 2 Recently, however, the Board overruled itself, and held that due process requires that
nonunion employees have an opportunity to vote because union affiliations change the designated bargaining representative.' 3 The Board reasoned that it is basic to the collective bargaining process that all
employees in the bargaining unit participate in selecting the bargaining
representative." Under the new interpretation of the due process requirement, the Board will reach the question whether continuity of representation exists between the pre- and post-affiliation unions only if the
affiliation decision was put to a unit-wide vote.' 5
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld the Board's new rule,
holding that it is within "the wide discretion of the Board to establish
procedures in an affiliation election that will ensure the fair and free
choice of the bargaining representative of all the employees."' 6 The
10. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
11. Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 360 (9th Cir.
1984) (quoting NLRB v. Newspapers, Inc., 515 F.2d 334, 339 (5th Cir. 1975)); see Fall
River House, Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1123 (1972); Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B.
571, 575 (1971) (quoting North Elec. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 942, 942 (1967)); East Ohio Gas
Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 1269, 1270 (1963).
12. See Providence Medical Center, 243 N.L.R.B. 714, 714 (1979); Coca Cola Bottling Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 1199, 1200 (1979), enforced, 616 F.2d 949 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 998 (1980); Amoco Prod. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 1195, 1195 (1979), remanded on
other grounds, 613 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1980); East Dayton Tool & Die Co., 190 N.L.RB.
577, 580 & n.ll (1971); Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571, 574 (1971); 1 C. Morris,
supra note 3, at 693; Union Mergers, supra note 1, at 600; see also Seattle-First Nat'l
Bank, 245 N.L.R.B. 700, 700 (union affiliations are internal union matters), vacated, 265
N.L.R.B. 426 (1982) (vacated after new rule instituted); Hale, supra note 1, at 721-22
(noting long-standing Board position that affiliations are internal union matters and that
nonunion members need not be afforded opportunity to vote).
13. See Amoco Prod. Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1240, 1241 (1982), enforced sub non. Local
Union No. 4-14 v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Van de Water, New
Trends in NLRB Law, 33 Lab. L.J. 635, 641 (1982) (noting new rule).
14. See Amoco Prod. Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1240, 1241 (1982) (quoting North Elec. Co.,
165 NLRB 942, 944 (1967) (Jenkins and Zagoria, Members, dissenting)), enforced sub
nom. Local Union No. 4-14 v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1983). Although Amoco
concerned an affiliation of a local union with a large international, the Board later made it
clear that its new rule also applies to mergers of independent locals. See Noesting Pin
Ticket Co., 116 L.R.R.M. 1192, 1192 (1984); Furr's Cafeterias, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 988,
990 (1984); F.W. Woolworth Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 805, 806 (1984).
15. Financial Inst. Employees, Local 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 359 (9th Cir.
1984). Compare Laborer's Int'l Union, Local No. 652, 266 N.L.R.B. 219, 220 (1983)
(continuity inquiry undertaken where affiliation approved by unit-wide vote) with Furr's
Cafeterias, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 988, 990 (1984) (no continuity inquiry where nonunion
employees not allowed to participate in election) and F.W. Woolworth Co., 268 N.L.R.B.
805, 805-06 (1984) (same).
16. Local Union No. 4-14 v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 150, 152-53 (5th Cir. 1983). Because
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Ninth Circuit, however, has struck down the new rule.1 7 That court reasoned that because union affiliations are purely internal union matters,

the new rule is irrational and inconsistent with established policies of

federal labor law.18 The court also believed that the new rule may
destabilize the bargaining relationship. 19
This Note argues. that nonunion employees in a bargaining unit must
be given an opportunity to vote in union affiliation decisions because the

NLRA grants them a right to select their bargaining representative. Further, this opportunity is necessary to preserve the validity of the NLRB's

certification and election procedures. Part I of this Note considers the
Board's old procedure for examining union affiliations and concludes

that it does not adequately protect the rights of nonunion employees.
Part II argues that affiliations are not purely internal union matters. Part

III examines the assertedly conflicting interests of employee free choice
and preservation of stability in the collective bargaining relationship and
concludes that the Board's new rule does not destabilize the bargaining
relationship.
I.

THE INADEQUACY OF THE BOARD'S OLD PROCEDURE

Before considering the Board's old procedure and its inadequacies, it is
necessary to examine the circumstances under which the Board considers

union affiliations.
Union affiliations come before the Board in two ways." Often the
newly affiliatied union will petition the Board to amend its certification.2t
Such an amendment is usually a precondition to enforcing an employer's

duty to bargain in good faith;' it also ensures a union Board protection
Congress has given the NLRB authority to develop and apply federal labor policy, see 29
U.S.C. § 156 (1982), the Board's rulings are subject to limited judicial review. Beth Israel
Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500-01 (1978); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S.
221, 236 (1963) (quoting NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96
(1957)); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941). They must be upheld
as long as they are rational and consistent with the NLRA. See Beth Israel Hosp., 437
U.S. at 501. The Board's "special competence in this field is the justification for the
deference accorded its determination." NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266
(1975); accord American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965).
17. See Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 357, 368
(9th Cir. 19-94).

18. See Id- at 367-68.
19. See id at 365-66, 368.
20. See 1 C. Morris, supra note 3, at 690; Dannin, supra note 1, at 171; Hale, supra
note 1, at 709-10; Union Affiliations, supra note 1, at 432.
21. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 1271, 1271 (1980); Williamson Co.,
244 N.L.R.B. 953, 953 (1979); Jasper Seating Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 1025, 1025 (1977); Factory Servs., 193 N.L.R.B. 722, 722 (1971). 29 C.F.R. § 102.60(b) (1984) provides that a
union may petition to amend its certification if there is no question concerning
representation.
22. Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 359 (9th Cir.
1984); see Union Affiliations, supra note 1, at 432.
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when an employer commits other unfair labor practices. 23 Affiliations
also come before the Board when an employer refuses to bargain with the

newly affiliated union and the union files an unfair labor practice
charge.24
In either case, the Board must examine the affiliation to determine
whether it violates certain NLRA provisions.2 5 Section 7 of the Act

gives employees the right "to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing."' 26 Section 9(a) mandates that "[r]epresentatives
designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees. . . shall be the exclusive representatives" of a
bargaining unit's employees.27 Both sections set forth a condition for

union certification or issuance of a bargaining order when a new affiliation is involved: The union must be a continuation of the old union
under a new name rather than a substantially different organization.2 8
An affiliation has met this condition only if no "question concerning representation" exists.29
23. See Hale, supra note 1, at 710-11. Section 8 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158
(1982), protects union members from certain types of employer conduct, see id. § 158
(a)(1)-(4), and imposes on an employer a duty to bargain in good faith "with the representatives of his employees," id. § 158 (a)(5), (d). Generally, the Board will not enforce
this duty unless the newly-affiliated union has had its certification amended. See supra
note 22 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g, Noesting Pin Ticket Co., 116 L.R.R.M. 1192, 1192 (1984); Furr's Cafeterias, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 988, 988 (1984); F.W. Woolworth Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 805, 805
(1984); William B. Tanner, 212 N.L.R.B. 566, 566, enforcement denied, 517 F.2d 982
(6th Cir. 1974).
25. See Hale, supra note 1, at 710-11. See infra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
27. Id. § 159(a) (1982).
28. See Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 361 (9th
Cir. 1984) (quoting Carpinteria Lemon Ass'n v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 554, 557 (9th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 909 (1957)), St. Vincent Hosp. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 1054,
1057 (10th Cir. 1980) (same); J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 850, 857 (5th
Cir.) (quoting NLRB v. Commercial Letter, Inc., 496 F.2d 35, 39 (8th Cir. 1974)), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 893 (1978); NLRB v. Pearl Bookbinding Co., 517 F.2d 1108, 1111-12
(1st Cir. 1975).
29. The Board will not amend a union's certification if a "question concerning representation" arises. Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356,
360 (9th Cir. 1984); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 225 N.L.R.B. 966, 967-68 (1976);
Fall River House, Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1123 (1972); North Elec. Co., 165 N.L.R.B.
942, 942 (1967); 29 C.F.R. § 102.60(b) (1984). When a question concerning representation exists, the Board is required to use the administrative machinery provided by § 9(c)
of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1982), to determine whether the union represents a
majority of employees in the bargaining unit. See id.§ 159(c) (1982); 1 C. Morris, supra
note 3, at 341. In the case of an affiliation, the Board will generally find that no question
concerning representation arises unless the certified union opposes the affiliation, the bargaining unit is changed, or the unit's members are not given an opportunity to consider
and vote on the affiliation decision. See American Bridge Div., United States Steel Corp.
v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 660, 663 (3d Cir. 1972); Lord Jim's, 259 N.L.R.B. 1162, 1163 (1982).
Compare Duquesne Light Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 1271, 1272-73 (1980) (affiliations approved
when these conditions met) and F.W. Woolworth Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 1208, 1208-09
(1972) (same) with 1820 Central Park Ave. Restaurant Corp., 116 L.R.R.M. 1393, 1393
(1984) (amendment of certification denied when no employee in unit participated in affili-
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The Board's Old Procedure and the Need for Change
1. Procedure

The Board conducts a two step inquiry to determine whether an affiliation raises "a question concerning representation." 3 If the Board concludes that such a question exists, it is empowered to conduct a unit-wide
election to ensure compliance with the Act.31 In the first step of the
inquiry, the Board examines whether the affiliation decision was conducted with sufficient due process to ensure that it reflected the wishes of
the majority of union members.32 If the due process test is satisfied,33 the
ation decision) and Independent Drug Store Owners, 211 N.L.R.B. 701, 701 (1974) (disapproval of affiliation that resulted in changes in bargaining representative), enforced sub
nom. Retail Store Employees Union v. NLRB, 528 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir. 1975). But see
Quemetco, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1398, 1398-99 (1976) (affiliation approved despite significant changes in bargaining representative as a result of affiliation).
30. See infra note 32. "Congress has entrusted the Board with a wide degree of discretion in establishing the procedure and safeguards necessary to insure the fair and free
choice of bargaining representatives by employees." NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S.
324, 330 (1946). In affiliation cases, the Board faces the difficult task of reconciling the
Act's sometimes inconsistent goals of guaranteeing employees their free choice and promoting stable collective bargaining relationships. Union Afflliations, supra note 1,at 433;
see Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571, 576 (1971) (Miller, Chairman, concurring).
The source of the election requirement is not easily determined. Hale, supra note 1,at
732-33. In early cases, the Board held that a union could change its affiliation outside of
the certification process while retaining the rights of the originally certified union. Id. at
711; see In re American Range Lines, Inc., 13 N.L.R.B. 139, 154 (1939); In re AmericanHawaiian S.S. Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 1355, 1366 (1939); In re Newark Rivet Works, 9
N.L.R.B. 498, 511 (1938). The first circuit court case to consider this issue held that
because "continuity of [the] organization was preserved," the employer's duty to bargain
remained after the affiliation. See Continental Oil Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 473, 477 (10th
Cir. 1940). The concept of continuity developed into one of the two elements that the
Board and the courts considered when they examined an affiliation. Hale, supra note 1,
at 711; see, eg., NLRB v. Harris-Woodson Co., 179 F.2d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 1950) (duty
to bargain enforced because union members approved affiliation and because it did not
alter identity of bargaining representative); East Ohio Gas Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 1269, 1270
(1963) (same). The case law thus developed a two-step approach to reviewing union
affiliations. Hale supra note 1, at 712. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
31. See American Bridge Div., United States Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 660, 663
(3d Cir. 1972). Section 9(c)(1) of the Act provides that "[i]f the Board finds . . . that
such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and
shall certify the results thereof." 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1982); see Underwriters Adjusting Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 453, 454 (1976). If no question arises, the union may amend its
certification through the simplified procedure set forth at 29 C.F.R. § 102.60(b) (1984).
American Bridge Div., United States Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 660, 663 (3d Cir.
1972). See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
32. Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 360 (9th Cir.
1984); Union Mergers, supra note 1, at 588; see NLRB v. Newspapers, Inc., 515 F.2d 334,
339 (5th Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Commercial Letter, Inc., 496 F.2d 35, 41-42 (8th Cir.
1974); Fall River House, Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1123 (1972); Hamilton Tool Co., 190
N.L.R.B. 571, 575 (1971) (quoting North Elec. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 942, 942 (1967)).
33. The Board has never laid down hard and fast rules regarding the manner in which
affiliation elections must be conducted, NLRB v. Newspapers, Inc., 515 F.2d 334, 339
(5th Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Commercial Letter, Inc., 496 F.2d 35,42 (8th Cir. 1974); Hale,
supra note 1, at 733-34; Union Mergers, supra note 1, at 598-99, but has held that due
process requires adequate notice of the pending election, ample opportunity to discuss the

1448

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

Board inquires whether "continuity of representation" exists between the
pre- and post-affiliation unions.3 4 The continuity inquiry focuses on
whether the union was substantially changed by the affiliation. 35 It seeks
to preserve the right of all employees to continued representation by a
bargaining representative that has been selected by a majority of employees in the bargaining unit.3 6 In its old due process inquiry, the Board
reasoned that any employee who wanted to vote on the affiliation could
join the union. 37 A finding of continuity of representation was thus held
to be sufficient to protect the rights of nonunion employees.38
2.

Protecting Nonunion Employees

Theoretically, a finding of continuity of representation protects the
question of affiliation before voting, and orderly voting by secret ballot. See Lord Jim's,
259 N.L.R.B. 1162, 1164 (1982); Providence Medical Center, 243 N.L.R.B. 714, 714
(1979); Amoco Prod. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 1195, 1196 (1979), remanded on other grounds,
613 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1980); New Orleans Pub. Serv., 237 N.L.R.B. 919, 920 (1978);
Quemetco, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1398, 1398, 1408 (1976); Hamilton Tool Co., 190
N.L.R.B. 571, 574-75 (1971); Union Mergers, supra note 1, at 599 n.70. Affiliations need
not comport with the Board's strict standards for certification elections. Aurelia Osborn
Fox Memorial Hosp., 247 N.L.R.B. 356, 359 (1980); Hale, supra note 1, at 721; see
Amoco Prod. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. at 1196; Quemetco, 226 N.L.R.B. at 1399. However, the
election must not be so "lax" or "substantially irregular" as to "negate the validity of the
election." Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 360 (9th
Cir. 1984) (quoting NLRB v. Commercial Letter, Inc., 496 F.2d 35, 42 (8th Cir. 1974)
(quoting Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571, 575 (1971)).
34. Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 360 (9th Cir.
1984); see, eg., Providence Medical Center, 243 N.L.R.B. 714, 714 (1979); Quemetco,
Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1398, 1399 (1976); Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571, 575 (1971).
35. "In making its continuity determination, the Board consider[s] such factors as
continuation of unit autonomy, retention of local officers, and continuation of established
union procedures (such as grievance procedures, voting procedures, and by-laws)." Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 361 (9th Cir. 1984).
Compare Sun Oil Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 1072, 1075 (continuity found where union retained
assets and officers and bargaining relationship underwent no change of consequence),
enforcement denied, 576 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1977) and Kentucky Power Co., 213 N.L.R.B.
730, 731 (1974) (continuity found where no change occurred in obligations of union to
members or procedures for contract negotiations and grievance and arbitration handling)
with Underwriters Adjusting Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 453, 454 (1976) (continuity not found
where pre-affiliation officers not retained and new collective bargaining procedure implemented) and Independent Drug Store Owners, 211 N.L.R.B. 701, 701 (1974) (continuity
not found where complete loss of identity of pre-affiliation union resulted from the affiliation), enforced sub nom. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 428 v. NLRB, 528 F.2d
1225 (9th Cir. 1975). See Hale, supra note 1, at 728-30, for a discussion of the origin of
the continuity inquiry.
36. See Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 361 (9th
Cir. 1984); Hale, supra note 1, at 715.
37. See Coca Cola Bottling Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 1199, 1200 (1979), enforced, 616 F.2d
949 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 998 (1980); Amoco Prod. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 1195,
1195 (1979), remanded on other grounds, 613 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1980); East Dayton Tool
& Die Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 577, 580 (1971).
38. See Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 361 (9th
Cir. 1981); Newspapers, Inc., 210 N.L.R.B. 8, 9 n.2 (1974), enforced, 515 F.2d 334 (5th
Cir. 1975); Hale, supra note 1, at 715.
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rights of nonunion employees by ensuring that the post-affiliation union
is substantially the same as the pre-affiliation union. 39 If the affiliation
does not substantially change the bargaining representative, there is assertedly no need for employees to vote on the affiliation because it would
not affect their rights under the Act.' In practice, however, the Board

often found continuity in affiliations that had resulted in significant

changes in the bargaining representative."1 Section 9(a) of the Act demands that a collective bargaining representative be chosen by a majority
of all employees in a bargaining unit. 2 Under its old procedure, the

Board often approved affiliations for which only a minority of employees
in the unit had voted.4 3 Additionally, mergers of local unions were ap-

proved even when no employees in one of the units had the opportunity
to vote.'

Thus, a finding of continuity of representation under the

39. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. The Board examines several factors to
determine whether continuity exists. See supra note 35.
40. See House of the Good Samaritan, 248 N.L.R.B. 539, 539 (1980) (a separate vote
for affiliation is not required where complete continuity in representation has been maintained); Aurelia Osborn Fox Memorial Hosp., 247 N.L.R.B. 356, 359 (1980) (same);
American Enka Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 1335, 1337 (1977) (same).
41. Sun Oil Co. v. NLRB, 576 F.2d 553, 557 (3d Cir. 1978) (denying enforcement of
Board finding of continuity when 31 member independent union affiliated with 200,000
member international union and became subject to international union's constitution);
American Bridge Div., United States Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 660, 664 (3d Cir.
1972) (denying enforcement of Board order approving affiliation when 300 member union
affiliated with 1,120,000 member international union, changed local officers, and became
subject to international union's constitution); Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.LRB. 571, 576
(1971) (Miller, Chairman, concurring) (criticizing continuity determination as a "legal
fiction" that permits "certification of a new and different bargaining agent during the life
of a [collective bargaining] contract, contrary to [the Board's] usual contract-bar rules").
The continuity inquiry has been criticized for several reasons. See Dannin, supra note 1,
at 175-79 (continuity inquiry does not further goals of NLRA); Hale, supra note 1, at
727-32 (continuity inquiry vague and inconsistent with its intended purpose); Union Affiliations, supra note 1, at 445-49 (continuity inquiry is misplaced theory derived from the
common law of contracts). Furthermore, the inquiry has been applied inconsistently by
the Board and the circuit courts. See Dannin,supra note 1, at 174-75; Hale, supra note 1,
at 713-19; Union Mergers, supra note 1, at 588-97. Compare Quemetco, Inc., 226
N.L.R.B. 1398, 1399 (1976) (affiliation approved despite lack of continuity) with Independent Drug Store Owners, 211 N.L.R.B. 701, 701 (1974) (disapproval of affiliation
when continuity not found) enforced sub nom. Retail Store Employees Union,, Local 428
v. NLRB, 528 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir. 1975) and J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. NLRB, 571
F.2d 850, 857 (5th Cir.) (court must consider whether changes occurred in right and
obligations of union members), cert denied, 439 U.S. 893 (1978) with NLRB v. Pearson
Candy Co., 471 F.2d 11, 12 (9th Cir. 1972) (sole inquiry is change in structure and character of union), cert denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973).
42. See supra note 30.
43. See Providence Medical Center, 243 N.L.R.B. 714, 718-19 (1979) (Penello, Member, concurring in part, dissenting in part) (Board approval of affiliation in which only
307 of 700 employees were eligible to vote and only 220 voted for the affiliation); Amoco
Prod. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 1195, 1196 (1979) (214 of unit's 480 employees approved affiliation), remanded on other grounds, 613 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1980); North Elec. Co., 165
N.L.R.B. 942, 944 (1967) (Jenkins and Zagoria, Members, dissenting) (52 of 288 employees voted for affiliation); East Ohio Gas Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 1269, 1271 (1963) (Rodgers,
Member, dissenting) (701 of 2989 employees voted for affiliation).
44. See NLRB v Pearl Bookbinding Co., 517 F.2d 1108, 1111 (1st Cir. 1975) (no vote

1450

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

Board's old procedure did not ensure that the decision to affiliate re-

flected the wishes of all employees in the bargaining unit.4" As a result it
was not always clear that the post-affiliation union was supported by the
majority of employees. Approval of such an affiliation violates section
9(a)'s clear mandate that all employees in a unit be afforded the opportunity to choose their bargaining representative.4 6 The Board's old procedure therefore failed in practice to protect the rights of nonunion
employees.
Even if the continuity inquiry were correctly and consistently applied,
it might still be insufficient to protect the rights of nonunion employees
because an affiliation may result in changes in the bargaining representa-

tive that were not apparent to the Board at the time of affiliation. For
example, the affiliation could cause points of contention subsequently to
arise between the employer and the union.4 7 Section 7 of the Act guarantees employees the right to bargain collectively "through representatives
of their own choosing." 4 8 This language should be interpreted to mean
that all employees should be given the opportunity to vote on actions
that result in any change in the bargaining representative.4 9 The Board's
new rule ensures this opportunity.
The continuity inquiry also fails to protect the rights of nonunion employees by providing them with no way to challenge the decision to affiliate.5 0 Such employees would probably be unable to file a decertification
on merger taken because majority of employees signed union authorization cards), enforcing 213 N.L.R.B. 532 (1974); House of the Good Samaritan, 248 N.L.R.B. 539, 539
(1980) (no vote of employees required because complete continuity found); Aurelia Os.
borne Fox Memorial Hosp., 247 N.L.R.B. 356, 359 (1980) (same); American Enka Co.,
231 N.L.R.B 1335, 1337 (1977) (same); Kentucky Power Co., 213 N.L.R.B. 730, 732
(1974) (after-the-fact affiliation vote held sufficient); Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 173
N.L.R.B. 311, 311-12 (1968) (same).
45. See Amoco Prod. Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1240, 1241 (1982), enforced sub nom. Local
Union No. 4-14 v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 150 (1983).
46. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
47. See Hale, supra note 1, at 740 n. 152. An affiliation will likely cause an employer
to alter its bargaining stance or strategy because it will be dealing with a larger, more
sophisticated organization. See id. Although an employer may not choose its employees'
union, NLRB v. Canton Sign Co., 457 F.2d 832, 840 (5th Cir. 1972); Newspapers, Inc.,
210 N.L.R.B. 8, 10 (1974), enforced, 515 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1975), it may be less willing
to bargain with the larger post-affiliation union. Employees who had previously enjoyed
a close working relationship with the employer may wish to consider this possible consequence before voting on the affiliation.
48. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
49. Cf Union Mergers,supra note 1, at 602-03 (rule requiring participation of nonunion employees in affiliation decisions is arguably consonent with and tailored to protect
employee's § 7 rights).
50. Under the NLRA, the NLRB has the power to certify a union as the exclusive
bargaining representative of a bargaining unit after a Board-conducted election. Brooks v.
NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98 (1954); see 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(i) (1982). The Act also gives
the Board the power to hold an election to decertify a union on a petition of the unit's
employees demonstrating a loss of majority support. R. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor
Law 49 (1976); see 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(ii) (1982). After initial certification the
union enjoys a true presumption of majority status for one year and a rebuttable pre-
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petition immediately after the affiliation because pre-existing contract, 5'
election,5 2 and certification 53 bars would remain in effect after the affiliation.14 As a practical matter, even after these bars were lifted, it is un-

likely that individual nonunion employees would be sufficiently familiar
with labor law to organize a decertification petition or have a sufficient

personal stake to make the expense worthwhile. Sole reliance on the continuity inquiry violates the rights of nonunion employees because it not

only fails to guarantee their participation in the affiliation decision, but
also provides no opportunity to challenge it.

The Ninth Circuit has argued that the continuity inquiry is sufficient
because employees desiring to protect their own interests may join the
union." Under the Board's old procedure, however, affiliations were approved in which nonmembers were not only excluded from voting, but
were also denied the opportunity to join the union in time to participate
in the election.5 6 More important, section 7 of the Act expressly gives
sumption thereafter. See Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d
356, 365 (9th Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Top Mfg. Co., 594 F.2d 223, 224 (9th Cir. 1979).
These presumptions limit the opportunities to challenge a certified bargaining representative's majority status. FinancialInst Employees, 752 F.2d at 365. See infra notes 52-54
and accompanying text.
51. Under the contract bar rule, "the Board will dismiss as untimely an election petition which is filed during the term of a collective bargaining agreement... which has a
duration of less than three years, or which is fied during the first three years of an agreement of longer fixed duration." R. Gorman, supra note 50, at 54; see General Cable
Corp., 139 N.L.RB. 1123, 1124-1125 (1962).
52. The NLRA states: "No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any
subdivision within which in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall
have been held." 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1982).
53. Under the certification bar, the Board will consider untimely an election petition
filed within twelve months of the certification of a union. R. Gorman, supra note 50, at
52-53; see In re Kimberly-Clark Corp., 61 N.L.R.B. 90, 92-93 (1945); In re Bohn Aluminum and Brass Corp., 57 N.L.R.B. 1684, 1686 (1944); In re Aluminum Co., 57 N.L.R.B.
913, 915-16 (1944); In re Beatty Logging Co., 55 N.L.1.B. 810, 811-12 (1944); In re
Monarch Aluminum Mfg. Co., 41 N.L.R1B. 1, 4-5 (1942).
54. See Hale,supra note 1, at 740-41. The Board does not consider the approval of an
affiliation to be a new certification. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co., 248 N.LRLB. 1271,
1273 (1980); Montgomery Ward & Co., 188 N.L.R.B. 551, 553 (1971); Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 311, 312 (1968); Emery Indus., 148 N.L.RLB. 51, 53 (1964).
Therefore, the existence of a contract at the time of an affiliation still bars an election for
the length of its term. See NLRB v. Bernard Gloekler N.E. Co., 540 F.2d 197, 203 (3d
Cir. 1976); Hale, supra note 1, at 740. This has led some to call for changes in the
application of the contract bar rule in affiliation cases. See Hamilton Tool Co., 190
N.L.R.B. 571, 576 (1971) (Miller, Chairman, concurring) (arguing that Board should
allow mid-contract Board election to determine whether a different agent should administer the contract for its duration); Hale, supra note 1, at 741 (arguing that presumption of
majority status following an affiliation should be rebuttable).
55. See Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 363 n.10
(9th Cir. 1984).
56. See NLRB v. Pearl Bookbinding Co., 517 F.2d 1108, 1111-12 (1st Cir. 1975);
NLRB v. Commercial Letter, Inc., 496 F.2d 35, 40 (8th Cir. 1974); Providence Medical
Center, 243 N.L.R1B. 714, 717 (1979) (Jenkins, Member, concurring in part, dissenting in
part); Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571, 574 (1971); North Elec. Co., 165 N.L.RLB.
942, 942-43 (1967).
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employees the choice of participating in or refraining from engaging in
union activities.5 7 Requiring an employee to join a union in order to
exercise the section 9 right to designate a bargaining representative violates section 7.58
The old procedure also undermined the Board's certification and election procedures.5 9 The Board has established strict procedures for initial
certification of a bargaining representative to ensure that the representative is the true choice of an uncoerced majority of all the employees in
the bargaining unit.' The Board does not, however, require that affilia57. Section 7 of the NLRA provides that employees have the right "to form, join, or
assist labor organizations ... and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of
such activities." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
58. See Amoco Prod. Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1240, 1241 (1982), enforced sub nom. Local
Union No. 4-14 v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1983).
59. See id.; Van de Water, supra note 13, at 641.
Before collective bargaining may begin, the identity of the proper collective bargaining
representative must be determined. R. Gorman, supra note 50, at 40. An employer may
voluntarily recognize a union as the representative of its employees. Id.; I C. Morris,
supra note 3, at 488; see, e.g., Landmark Int'l Trucks, Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1375
(1981), vacated on other grounds, 699 F.2d 815 (6th Cir. 1983); Nevada Lodge, 227
N.L.R.B. 368, 369 (1976), enforced, 584 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1978); Tahoe Nugget, Inc.,
227 N.L.R.B. 357, 357 (1976), enforced, 584 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1978); Keller Plastics E.,
Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 587 (1966). If such recognition is withheld, a union may petition
the Board to hold an election under § 9(c) of the NLRA so that the union may be certified as the exclusive representative of the bargaining unit. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(l)(A)(i)
(1982). Even a union that can secure voluntary recognition may choose to petition for a
Board election because such an election leads to Board certification of its results, and the
Act gives favored treatment to unions that have been certified rather than informally
recognized. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(C) (protection from concerted activities of other
unions); id. § 158(b)(7) (protection for certain forms of concerted activity). The Board
investigates the petition, and will hold a hearing "if it has reasonable cause to believe that
a question of representation affecting commerce exists." Id. § 159(c)(1). If the Board
finds that such a question exists, "it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall
certify the results thereof." Id. All employees in the unit are eligible to vote in the election, which is conducted under the supervision of agents from the regional office of the
NLRB. R. Gorman, supra note 50, at 41, 43. See generally id. at 40-49 (discussion of
certification and election procedures).
60. Before certifying a union as the exclusive bargaining representative of a group of
employees, the Board conducts an election supervised by agents from its regional offices.
See supra note 59. These elections are held under strict conditions: Ballots are furnished
by the Board, and only a Board agent and the voter may handle a ballot. See NLRB
Field Manual 11306. Polling is conducted and supervised by Board agents, and voting is
by secret ballot and takes place in voting booths to ensure absolute secrecy. R. Gorman,
supra note 50, at 46-47; 1 C. Morris, supra note 3, at 395.
The Board also has the power to police pre-election campaigns to ensure that the parties do not engage in conduct that may affect the free choice of the employees in the unit.
See NLRB v. Sanitary Laundry, Inc., 441 F.2d 1368, 1369 (10th Cir. 1971); Kerona
Plastics Extrusion Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 1120, 1120 (1972) (quoting New York Tel. Co., 109
N.L.R.B. 788, 790 (1954)). The Board's goal is to conduct elections under laboratory
conditions "'as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees' "and to provide "an atmosphere conducive to the sober and informed exercise of
the franchise, free not only from interference, restraint, or coercion violative of the Act,
but also from other elements which prevent or impede a reasoned choice." Sewell Mfg.
Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 69-70 (1962) (quoting General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127
(1948), enforced, 192 F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 904 (1952)). If
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tion elections comply with these procedures. 6 ' Therefore, a union could

amend its certification after an affiliation election that did not comport
with the Board's strict standards for certification elections and that denied participation to a number of employees.62 If the Board accepts pri-

vately conducted elections as a basis for an amendment of certification, it
should require that all employees be permitted to vote.63
B.

The New Rule and Its Role

Sole reliance on the continuity inquiry to protect the rights of nonunion employees has led to impositions on them of bargaining representatives whom they had no opportunity to choose." Because this result
violates the spirit and purpose of the Act, the Board has adopted a requirement that all employees in the bargaining unit be given the opportunity to vote on affiliation decisions. 6 The new rule is necessary to

protect the rights of nonunion employees under sections 7 and 9(a) of the
Act.66 It does not, however, eliminate the need for the continuity inquiry.6 7 Even if all employees have the opportunity to vote on the affilia-

conduct on the part of either the employer or the union tends to coerce or influence the
free choice of the employees in the unit, the Board may set aside the results and order a
new election. 1 C. Morris, supra note 3, at 310; see, eg, NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co.,
375 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1964) (employer promised benefits to employees who voted against
union); Al Long, Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 447, 448 (1968) (general atmosphere of confusion,
violence and threats of violence); Michem, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 362, 362-63 (1968)
(campaigning too close to polls); Wagner Elec. Corp., 167 N.L.R.B. 532, 533 (1967)
(grant of benefits by union to employees); Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 72 (1962)
(employer appeal to racial prejudice). See generally I C. Morris, supra note 3, at 309-40,
393-412 (discussing certification elections and restrictions on pre-eection activity).
61. See supra note 33.
62. See Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571, 575-76 (1971) (certification amended
after union conducted affiliation election from which 30 employees were excluded); North
Elec. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 942, 942-43 (1967) (certification amended after union held election in which 50 employees were denied participation).
63. Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 368 (9th Cir.
1984) (Wright, J., dissenting) (quoting Local Union No. 4-14 v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 150,
152 n.2 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Amoco Prod. Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1240, 1241 (1982)
(quoting North Elec. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 942, 944 (1967) (Jenkins and Zagoria, Members,
dissenting)))), enforced sub nom. Local Union No. 4-14 v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.
1983); see Van de Water, supra note 13, at 641.
64. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
65. See Noesting Pin Ticket Co., 116 L.RR.M. 1192, 1192 (1984); Furr's Cafeterias,
Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 988, 990 (1984); F.W. Woolworth Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 805, 806 (1984);
Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 265 N.L.R.B. 426, 426 (1982), enforcement denied sub nora.
Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1984);
Amoco Prod. Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1240, 1241 (1982), enforced sub nom. Local No. 4-14 v.
NLRB, 721 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1983).
66. See supra notes 46-62 and accompanying text.
67. In Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356 (9th Cir.
1984), the Ninth Circuit criticized the Board's new rule as irrational because it is "unreasonably duplicative." Id at 367. After a unit-wide election in which the affiliation was
approved, the Board could still call a formal representation election if its continuity inquiry determined that the post-affiliation union was substantially different from the preaffiliation union.
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tion, a new union may be a substantially different organization.6" If so,

the Board will conduct a unit-wide vote under conditions stricter than
required in the original affiliation election.69 The continuity inquiry is
thus an additional safeguard of employee rights under the Act.7"
II.

BOARD INTERVENTION IN UNION AFFILIATIONS

The Ninth Circuit has struck down the new requirement, urging that it
is "irrational and inconsistent" with federal labor policy because affiliations are purely internal union matters 7' relating to a union's self-governance into which the Board does not ordinarily intrude.72 Internal union
68. American Bridge Div., United States Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 660, 662-63
(3d Cir. 1972) (all employees permitted to vote on affiliation of 304-member union with
1,120,000 member union); Quemetco, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1398, 1399 (1976) (all unit
members voted on affiliation that resulted in change in local officers and transfer of preaffiliation union's assets).
69. The Board does not require that affiliation elections comport with the same standards as its certification elections. See supra text accompanying note 61.
70. Preservation of the continuity inquiry would also help prevent subversion of the
contract bar rule because it would not allow substitution of a new and different bargaining representative during the life of an existing contract. Cf American Bridge Div.,
United States Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 660, 665 (3d Cir. 1972) (to permit amendment of certification procedure to allow changes in identity of bargaining representatives
without Board elections would be contrary to the purposes of the Board's rules). See
supra note 51.
71. Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 362-64 (9th
Cir. 1984). There is a longstanding federal labor policy of avoiding unnecessary interference in union affairs:
National labor policy has been built on the premise that by pooling their
economic strength and acting through a labor organization freely chosen by the
majority, the employees of an appropriate unit have the most effective means of
bargaining for improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions. The
policy therefore extinguishes the individual employee's power to order his own
relations with his employer and creates a power vested in the chosen representative to act in the interests of all employees . . . . The employee may disagree
with many of the union decisions but is bound by them. "The majority-rule
concept is today unquestionably at the center of our federal labor policy." "The
complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected. A
wide range of reasonableness must allowed a statutory bargaining representative
in serving the unit it represents . .. ."
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967) (footnote omitted) (quoting
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953) and Wellington, Union Democracy
and FairRepresentation: FederalResponsibility in a FederalSystem, 67 Yale L.J. 1327,
1333 (1958)). Nonunion members "have no voice in the affairs of the union." AllisChalmers, 388 U.S. at 191 (footnote omitted). Therefore, the Board has recently stated
that it has not required that they be allowed to vote in internal union matters such as
strike votes, contract ratification votes, and the selection of officers, stewards and negotiators. See Amoco Prod. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 1195, 1196 (1979), remanded on other grounds,
613 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1980); see also North Coast Counties Dist. Council of Carpenters,
197 N.L.R.B. 905, 906 (1972) (nonunion members not required to vote on contract ratification); M & M Oldsmobile, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 903, 905 (1966) (contract ratifications
need only comply with union's constitution), enforced, 377 F.2d 712 (2d Cir. 1967).
72. See Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 362-63
(9th Cir. 1984); see also North Coast Counties Dist. Council of Carpenters, 197 N.L.R.B.

1985]

RIGHTS OF NONUNION EMPLOYEES

1455

matters are only those that relate to a union's self-governance.' 3 An afiiation changes the bargaining representative,74 and the Board has held
that "[a]ny change in the collective-bargaining representative has the potential to affect the interests of all employees [in the bargaining unit]. 1"
Because affiliations directly affect the NLRA rights of nonunion employees, the6 decision to affiliate cannot be regarded as a strictly internal union

affair.7
In holding that affiliations are strictly internal, the Ninth Circuit relied

on four Supreme Court cases." This reliance was unfounded. In the one

case involving union activities that affected nonunion members, the
Court upheld a union rule that prohibited nonunion members and nonemployees from contributing to union election campaigns. 78 Unlike an

affiliation decision, the election of union officials has no potential for in-

fringing the rights of nonunion employees.79 The Court emphatically declared in a companion case to one cited by the Ninth Circuit that
potential infringement justifies Board interference."0 The other cases

cited by the Ninth Circuit" involved union rules having no effect on
905, 906 (1972) (contract ratification vote); M & M Oldsmobile, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 903,
905 (1966) (same), enforced, 377 F.2d 712 (2d Cir. 1967).
73. Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 363 (9th Cir.
1984); see Amoco Prod. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 1195, 1195-96 (1979), remanded on other
grounds, 613 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1980); see also North Coast Counties Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 197 N.L.R.B. 905, 906 (1972) (Board will not interfere in contract ratification vote); M & M Oldsmobile, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 903, 905 (1966) (same), enforced, 377
F.2d 712 (2d Cir. 1967).
74. See Dannin, supra note 1, at 175 (continuity inquiry looks for change where
change always occurs); see also Union Mergers,supra note 1, at 175 (affiliation's effect on
bargaining relationship requires Board to inquire whether bargaining representative has
changed); cf Amoco Prod. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 1195, 1196 (1979) (any change in the bargaining representative has the potential to affect all employees), remanded on other
grounds, 613 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1980); Van de Water, supra note 13, at 641 (same).
75. Amoco Prod. Co., 239 N.L.RLB. 1195, 1196 (1979), remanded on other grounds,
613 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1980); see Van de Water, supra note 13, at 641.
76. Even under its old procedure, the Board did not treat affiliations as internal union
affairs. See Amoco Prod. Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1240, 1241 (1982) (old due process inquiry
required scrutiny of union-conducted elections), enforced sub nom. Local Union No. 4-14
v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1983). Indeed, if Congress had not intended the Board
to involve itself in union affiliations, it would not have required the Board to determine
whether a question concerning representation exists before amending a union's certification. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.60(b) (1984).
77. Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 362-64 (9th
Cir. 1984) (citing United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982); NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973); Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969); NLRB v. AllisChalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967)).
78. See United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 121 (1982).
79. See Van de Water, supra note 13, at 641; cf.Amoco Prod. Co., 262 N.L.R.B.
1240, 1241 (1982) (only votes involving affiliations effect matters within scope of Act),
enforced sub nom. Local Union No. 4-14 v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1983).
80. See Booster Lodge No. 405 v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84, 87-90 (1973) (union attempt to
discipline nonunion members for exercising § 7 rights constitutes an unfair labor
practice).
81. Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 362 (9th Cir.
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nonunion employees. Two of these cases dealt with union discipline of
union members who failed to observe picket lines 2 and one concerned
the suspension of union members who had violated a union rule relating
to production ceilings.8 3 All
were decided under an NLRA section unreS4
lated to union affiliations.
In fact, rather than precluding Board interference in union affiliation
decisions, two of these cases demonstrate that even if union affiliations
are strictly internal union matters, Board intervention would still be justified.8 5 In those cases, the Court held that the Board may intervene in
an internal union matter when a statutory labor policy has been infringed. The Act 6 and its legislative history, 7 as well as decisions of the
Board 8 and the courts, 9 show clearly that preserving employees' right
1984) (citing NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973); Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423
(1969); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967)).
82. See NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 68-69 (1973); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 176 (1967).
83. See Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 426 (1969).
84. All three of these cases were decided under § 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA, which
shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization . . . to reprovides that "[i]t
strain or coerce .. . employees in the exercise of [their § 7] rights." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(1)(A) (1982); see NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 68 (1973); Scofield v.
NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 426-27 (1969); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175,
178 (1967).
85. See NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 78 (1973); Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423,
430, 432 (1969).
86. Section 1 of the NLRA provides:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate
and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by . . .protecting
the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). Section 7 of the Act guarantees employees the right "to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
87. See H.R. Rep. No. 1371, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1935) ("[e]xperience has proved
that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively
safeguards commerce from injury"), reprintedin 2 NLRB, Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act, 1935, at 3253 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Legislative History]; H.R. Rep. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1935) (protecting the rights of
employees to organize and bargain collectively eliminates many causes of industrial
strife), reprinted in Legislative History, supra, at 2916; S.Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1935) (collective bargaining process subsumes the rights of employees to organize
freely and to deal with employers through representatives of their own choosing), reprinted in Legislative History, supra, at 2301.
88. See 1820 Central Park Ave. Restaurant Corp., 116 L.R.R.M. 1393, 1393 (1984)
(of primary importance in affiliation cases is whether employees had opportunity to pass
on the change of representative); F.W. Woolworth Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 805, 805-06 (1984)
(same); Aurelia Osborn Fox Memorial Hosp., 247 N.L.R.B. 356, 359 (1980) (same);
Quemetco, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1398, 1399 (1976) (employees' freedom to select bargaining representative of their choice is of paramount importance under Act).
89. See NLRB v. Raytheon Co., 398 U.S. 25, 27 (1970) (Act is designed to protect
employees in the exercise of their organizational rights); International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 79 (1940) (employee free choice is the essence of collective
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to choose their own bargaining representative is one such policy. Be-

cause exclusion of nonunion employees from affiliation votes violates this
policy, Board intervention should not be precluded.
III.

EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE AND STABILITY IN THE BARGAINING
RELATIONSHIP

Board review of union affiliation decisions raises questions concerning
the sometimes conflicting federal labor policies of employee free choice9 '
and promotion of stability91 in the collective bargaining92 relationship.9 3
The Ninth Circuit states that the Board has traditionally favored the latter over the former94 and that the Board's new rule irrationally departs

from this policy by effectively decertifying a union before its loss of majority status can be established."

However, an affiliation in which non-

union employees do not participate frequently casts doubt on the union's
continuing majority status.9 6 Furthermore, although preservation of stability in the bargaining relationship is an important policy of federal labor law,97 the Board has also given great weight to the right of employees
bargaining); NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261, 265-66 (1938)
(Act's purpose was to secure employees' § 7 rights); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (right of employees to select representatives of their own choosing is
fundamental); Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489,
512 (5th Cir. 1982) (principal policy of Act is to protect exercise of full freedom of
designation of bargaining representatives), cert denied, 104 S. CL 335 (1983); NLRB v.
Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 391 F.2d 119, 123 (3d Cir.) (same), cert denied, 393 U.S. 978
(1968).
90. See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
91. In furtherance of the Act's purposes, the Board has created rules to ensure that
once a union has been certified as an exclusive bargaining representative, the collective
bargaining relationship is given time to succeed. See supra notes 53-55, infra note 108
and accompanying text. A goal of the NLRA is the promotion of industrial peace. See
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). The Board believes that this goal will be furthered by preservation of continuity in the bargaining structure. Financial Inst. Employees Local No. 1182
v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 364-65 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino,
623 F.2d 571, 578 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 906 (1981)).
92. Section 8(d) of the NLRA defines collective bargaining as:
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by
either party...
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
93. Union Affiliations, supra note 1, at 433; see Hamilton Tool Co., 190 N.LR.B. 571,
576 (1971) (Miller, Ch., concurring).
94. See Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 365 (9th
Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571, 578 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 906 (1981).
95. See Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 365-66
(9th Cir. 1984).
96. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
97. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
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freely to choose their own bargaining representative.98 Indeed, both the

Board99 and the Courts"ic have held that preserving employee free choice

is of primary importance under the Act. In the rules and procedures it

has established, the Board never intended to sacrifice free choice to bargaining stability. The certification bar was created only after the Board
realized that a bargaining relationship must be allowed a certain amount
of time to succeed. 10 ' The contract bar rule was not intended to favor

over another, but to balance free choice with industrial
one policy
02
stability. 1
It is not likely, as the Ninth Circuit claims, that the Board's new rule

will promote instability in the bargaining relationship. That court argued that the rule will encourage employers to withdraw from collective

bargaining contracts with unions that have affiliated without a unit-wide
vote. 103 Unions considering affiliation, however, will undoubtedly become familiar with Board procedure. 1" Those unions that fear a lack of
majority support for the affiliation will fail to hold a unit-wide elec-

tion.1"' The new rule will decertify a newly affiliated union only if the
affiliation decision was not put to a vote of all employees in the bargain-

ing unit.'0 6 In these cases, Board approval of the affiliation would violate
98. See supra note 95, infra note 106 and accompanying text. Cf NLRB v. Western
& S. Life Ins. Co., 391 F.2d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 1968) (preservation of bargaining stability
not to be afforded greater weight than employee free choice), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 978
(1968).
99. See 1820 Central Park Ave. Restaurant Corp., 116 L.R.R.M. 1393, 1393 (1984);
F.W. Woolworth Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 805, 805-06 (1984); Aurelia Osborn Fox Memorial
Hosp., 247 N.L.R.B. 356, 359 (1980); Quemetco, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1398, 1399 (1976);
Newspapers, Inc., 210 N.L.R.B. 8, 9 (1974), enforced, 515 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1975).
100. See NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261, 265-66 (1938);
NLRB v. Western and S. Life Ins. Co., 391 F.2d 119, 123 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
978 (1968); Blanchard v. Johnson, 388 F. Supp. 208, 215 (N.D. Ohio 1974), affid in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 532 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
101. R. Gorman, supra note 50, at 53; see In re Kimberly-Clark Corp., 61 N.L.R.B.
90, 92-93 (1945) (certification bar created to encourage formation of collective bargaining
contracts and promote industrial peace); Centr-O-Cast & Eng'g. Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1507,
1508 (1952) (same).
102. See General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962); R. Gorman, supra
note 50, at 52. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit failed to recognize that, in balancing
conflicting interests of federal labor law, "'[t]he function of striking that balance. ...
Congress committed primarily to the [NLRB], subject to limited judicial review.'"
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963) (quoting NLRB v. Truck Drivers
Union, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957)); NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477,
499 (1960) (same).
103. See Financial Inst. Employees, Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 359 (9th
Cir. 1984).
104. Cf. Hale, supra note 1, at 711 (practical result of new rule will be to induce unions
contemplating affiliation to comply with Board procedure).
105. Cf Bartenders Ass'n., 213 N.L.R.B. 651, 655 (1974) (Kennedy, Member, dissenting) (union's refusal to demonstrate its continuing majority status through expeditious
election generates suspicion that it is not confident of majority support).
106. See, e.g., Noesting Pin Ticket Co., 116 L.R.R.M. 1192, 1192 (1984); F.W. Woolworth Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 805, 805 (1984); Exchange Bank, 264 N.L.R.B. 822, 822 (1982),
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the rights of nonunion employees10 7 and undermine the Board's certification and election procedures.10 8 The Board's new rule will endanger the
bargaining relationship only when a union endangers the rights of nonunion employees by failing to follow Board procedure.
CONCLUSION

The NLRB has ruled that due process requires that nonunion employees in a bargaining unit be given an opportunity to participate in union
affiliation decisions. The Ninth Circuit struck down the new rule, holding that it is irrational in light of prior Board procedure and inconsistent
with established federal labor policy. The Board's new rule is necessary,
however, because prior procedure in such cases inadequately protected
the right of nonunion employees to select their bargaining representative.
Board intervention in such cases is appropriate because union affiliations
are not purely internal affairs and affect all employees in a bargaining
unit. The rule will endanger the bargaining relationship only when unions endanger the rights of nonunion employees. It is a rational interpretation of the Act and consistent with federal labor policy. It should
therefore be upheld.
Edward J O'Connell
enforced, 732 F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1984); Amoco Prod. Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1240, 1240-41
(1982), enforced sub nom. Local Union No. 4-14 v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1983).
107. See supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.

